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WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS  
An Interview with Stef Snel 
 
Linda Botha with Pablo Lumerman 
 
 
This interview is no. 10 of 15 in a series of Reflections from Practice that ACDS produced for ACCESS 
Facility. The series shares insights on company-community dialogue and rights-compatible, interest-
based conflict resolution from senior practitioners. Please cite as Botha, L. (2015). When all else fails: 
An interview with Stef Snel No. 10 (B. Ganson, ed.). The Hague: ACCESS Facility. Accessible from 
Scholar.SUN.ac.za.  
 
 Stef Snel  is an experienced practitioner and facilitator in multiparty mediation, conflict facilitation, 
policing, peace building and organisational problem solving. He practices in the public, business and 




Question: What recurring theme or issue do you experience in your work as a company-community 
dialogue facilitator? 
 
Answer: The tendency of powerful actors to see third party facilitators as a last resort.  
 
Relationships between local communities and the private sector or government typically have a 
backdrop of power imbalances and structural inequality. Expectations are raised when officials try to 
win favour from voters before elections, or when companies make promises they claim will serve the 





These upheavals place company and government officials in a difficult position. On the one hand, 
communities blame them for failing to honour their commitments or respond to community needs. 
On the other hand, companies and authorities expect to facilitate dialogues with communities meant 
to solve problems in which they themselves are embedded. They find themselves playing the role of 
both player and referee in the conflict. 
 
This is very common when one of the parties involved in a dispute has disproportionately more power 
and resources. Uptake of third party mediation services is low, since those in positions of power seem 
to believe they can solve everything by themselves. But this is often not possible.  
Companies and authorities often seek assistance from mediators only as a last resort. They literally 
wait until the tyres are burning before they seek third party intervention. By the time they decide to 
bring expert mediators in, things have already spiralled out of control, and the conflict has become 
intractable.  
 
From a risk mitigation perspective this approach make no sense, as the human and property costs of 
violent conflict far outweigh the cost of third party mediation at a earlier stage in the conflict cycle. It 
is a major challenge to change this mentality within powerful institutions. 
 
Question:  What is a practical example of this? 
 
Answer: A crisis that unfolded between displaced refugees and a local community.  
 
A small agricultural town in the Western Cape Province of South Africa was the scene of xenophobic 
clashes between local South Africans and immigrant communities from Zimbabwe. This town 
functions as a doorway for many people looking for work in the Western Cape.   
Some local community members felt that Zimbabweans were taking job opportunities away from 
them. They forced about 3000 immigrants out of the area. Many were robbed and attacked. This crisis 
led the Provincial government and the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to set 
up a temporary refugee camp on a sports field in the middle of town.  
 
In preparation for hosting a major international sporting event, pressure was put on local and 
provincial government officials to deal with the problem. As a result, officials intensified the conflict 
through their heavy-handed approach. They started threatening the refugees, demanding that they 
leave the camp. The refugees did not feel safe enough to leave. Things got really nasty between 
government officials and people in the camp. Other groups started getting involved, including NGOs 
and local farmers who offered humanitarian assistance to the refugees.  
 
It was only after a prolonged period of tension and after all the other options were exhausted that 
government finally agreed to get external mediators involved. By then the situation had become quite 
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desperate, with potentially far-reaching economic consequences. One such consequence was a run-
off of human waste from the camp that could have had a devastating impact on the area’s lucrative 
agricultural export business.  
 
The private sector and local municipality were made aware of this threat. It was primarily this motive 
that finally led to the powerful actors, government and private sector, to treat the problem with more 
urgency and to make resources available for a complex mediation. Finally, a multi-party negotiation 
process among the refugees, NGOs, and the local and provincial authorities became possible.  
 
Question: How did this impact the parties’ ability to achieve rights-compatible, interest-based 
outcomes? 
 
Answer: Third party mediation restored recognition of the refugee’s rights. 
 
Before mediators got involved, the rights of the refugees were not respected. It was clear that they 
felt mistreated. The local communities displaced them, and once they found shelter in the camp, the 
authorities didn’t want them there either. They felt pushed around. Being treated in a respectful and 
humane way was their main concern.  
Over the course of three days, local community leaders, officials and the committee representing the 
refugees developed a complicated, multi-faceted agreement involving many different stakeholders.  
 
The implementation process needed to be project-managed by the mediators over a number of 
months in an environment of distrust.  
 
An interesting requirement of the agreement was that a mass mediation be convened between the 
refugees and the local residents who originally expelled them, as most refugees wanted to return to 
the communities from which they were displaced. As it turned out, many locals wanted them to return 
since the refugees were an important part of the local economy. After these terms of the agreement 
were met, the camp formally closed down.  
 
If government had not finally brought third party mediators into the dispute, a lengthy and expensive 
18-month court case would have ensued, probably leading to a decision to forcibly evict the refugees 
and even more conflict. Through mediation, refugees left the camp voluntarily and peacefully. The 
vast majority of the refugees returned to continue their lives within the local community. The UNHRC 





This shows that mediation has the potential to change the trajectory of a conflict, even in the less-
than-ideal scenario when it is used as a last resort. This begs the question, however, of the conditions 
and mind-sets that would make it possible for powerful parties to call upon independent and skilful 
mediation expertise to help them resolve their disputes before a conflict escalates. 
 
 
Question:  The answer to what question would have helped you be able to more effectively 
intervene as a third party? 
 
Answer: How can we get powerful institutions to include third party mediators early on in conflict 
situations?  
 
Mediation is still not considered part of the toolkit or choices for powerful institutional players when 
there is conflict with less powerful groups. As was the case with the refugee camp, mediation is seen 
as the last resort only after a certain level of desperation is reached.  Surely mediation is much cheaper 
and faster than engaging in legal battles? These solutions are also almost always more long-lasting 
and sustainable, as well as more humanising and affirming of human dignity.  In other parts of the 
world, mediation has become institutionalised and is part of how governments and private companies 
operate. In the United States, government authorities have dispute resolution processes in place, 
motivated primarily by reducing legal costs.  How can we promote this attitude more widely?  
 
Sometimes our mediation work has powerful effects that immediately demonstrate its value to those 
working in large and powerful institutions. It can also sometimes even serve as a pro-active 
intervention to ensure positive future outcomes in a pressurised environment.  A good example of 
this was the outcomes of mediation work we did last year for the semi-state organisation that 
administers our elections. Community-based mediation took place to reduce political conflict 
motivated by the elections, but was then also extended to the staff of the organisation itself, since the 
pressure of managing elections also caused some internal disputes. 
 Thanks to the interventions, voting stations ran smoothly during local elections and there was a 
record turn-around time in resolving disputes and closing voting stations.  These are the kind of 
examples that will hopefully lead to a paradigm shift in terms of how third party mediation can work 
is perceived by companies and authorities.  
 
Uptake of mediation services will also rely heavily on whether facilitators are seen as trustworthy by 
all parties. There are lots of independent institutions and individuals that can step up to fulfil this role. 
We do however need to build more capacity to get mediators on the ground with the right skills to 
intervene in complex cases. 
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